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Nagel: The Re-Emergence of the Trust Relationship after United States v.

COMMENTS
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE TRUST
RELATIONSHIP AFTER UNITED STATES
v. MITCHELL
In April, 1980 the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Claims' decision in Mitchell v. UnitedStates1 and remanded the
case to the Court of Claims for further consideration. The
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mitchell2 was
viewed as a "discouraging episode in Indian law", 3 since it left
both the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over Indian breach
of trust suits and the Indian trust relationship with the United
States in doubt. This comment will trace the re-establishment
by the Court of Claims of its jurisdiction over Indian breach of
trust suits, as well as the emerging definition of the trust relationship in that court. Finally, the comment suggests that the
Court of Claims should stringently enforce all private trust
principles in those suits involving Government mismanagement of Indian natural resources.
THE MITCHELL DECISION

The Quinault Indians 4 brought suit against the United
States Government in the Court of Claims under the General
Allotment Act 5 (GAA) for the mismanagement of the tribe's
Copyright© 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
2. 445 U.S. 535, 546 (1980). The Court held that:
The General Allotment Act... cannot be read as establishing that the United
States has a fiduciary responsibility for the management of allotted forest
lands.
Any right of the respondents to recover money damages for government
mismanagement
of timber resources must be found in some source other than
that Act.
3. Hughes, Can the TrusteeBe Suedfor its Breach?The SadSaga of the UnitedStatesv. Mitchell, 26 S.D.L. REv. 447, 493 (1981).
4. The respondents included 1,465 individual allottees of land contained within the Quinault
Reservation, the Quinault Tribe, and the Quinault Allottees Association. The Quinault
Reservation is located in northwestern Washington. It was established by executive
order in 1873. The term "allottee" is used to describe the individual Indian who received
a statutorily defined amount, or an allotment, of land under the General Allotment Act.
Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d at 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See Quinault Allottee Ass'n v.
United States, 485 F.2d 1391, 1393-95 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974),
for a history of the formation of the Quinault Reservation and the allotment process on
that Reservation.
5. 25 U.S.C. SS 331-358 (1976). The General Allotment Act was enacted in 1887 in an attempt to assimilate the Indians into a white society. The main thrust of the Act was to
break up communal ownership of tribal lands and allot each member of the tribe a certain
amount of land. A general discussion of the intent and effects of the General Allotment
Act can be found in COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 130-44 (1982).
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timber resources. 6 The Quinaults contended that a trust relationship was explicitly established by the language of the
GAA.7 Consequently, the trust relationship created a substantive right upon which the Indians could base their claim, and
upon which the court's jurisdiction could be properly invoked.
The authority of the Court of Claims to entertain actions
brought by individual Indians was invoked under 28 U.S.C. S
1491 (Tucker Act), which states
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort.8
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims on behalf of the tribe is
set out in 28 U.S.C. 5 1505:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim
against the United States accruing after August 13,
1946, in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable
group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever
such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the
President, or is one which otherwise would be
6. Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The Indians alleged that the
Government had: (1) failed to obtain fair market value for timber sold; (2) failed to
manage timber on a sustained yield basis and to rehabilitate the land after logging; (3)
failed to obtain payment for some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper

system of roads and easements for timber operations and exacted improper charges from
aottees for roads; (5) failed to pay interest on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative charges from allottees. Id. at 1301 n.4. For an overview of the management
of Quinault timber resources, see Beaty, A Study of B.LA. Timber Management on the
QuinaultIndianReservation 1950-1970, in II STUDIES IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW (1971).

7. 25 U.S.C. S 348 (1976). The GAA provides in pertinent part:
Patents to be held in trust:
Upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this act by the
Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of
the allottees, which patents shall be of the legal effect, and declare that the
United States does and will hold the land thus allotted, for the period of twentyfive years, in trustfor the sole use and benefit of the Indian... and that at the

expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to
said Indian ... in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge of incumbrance whatsoever; Provided, that the President of the U.S. may in any case, in
his discretion extend the period.

(emphasis added).
8. 28 U.S.C. S 1491 (1976).
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cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were
not an Indian tribe, band or group. 9
The United States moved to dismiss the Indians' suit on the
grounds that the Government had not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the claims raised. The Court of Claims
rejected the Government's jurisdictional challenge and held
that the General Allotment Act sustained the Indians' claim
for a breach of trust suit.10
The issue then before the Supreme Court in Mitchell was
whether the General Allotment Act authorized the award of
money damages against the United States for the alleged
mismanagement of forests located on lands allotted to the Indians under the Act.1" The Court began its analysis of Mitchell
with a discussion of sovereign immunity, substantive rights,
and jurisdiction.' 2 The Court asserted, as an elementary proposition, that "[Tihe United States as sovereign is immune
from suit save as it consents to be sued... and the terms of its
consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction
to entertain the suit."' 3 The Court noted that the waiver of
sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' 4 The statutes upon which the Indians
had based jurisdiction, the Tucker Act and 28 U.S.C. S 1505,
were held to be jurisdictional only and neither created a
substantive right nor contained an explicit waiver of sovereign
immunity. 16 The Court considered U.S. v. Testan'6 as determinative of the jurisdictional issue. 17 The Court concluded,
therefore, that the Indians must look elsewhere for either a
or a substantive right upon
waiver of sovereign immunity
8
claims.'
their
which to base
Since the Indians relied upon the General Allotment Act as
establishing a trust relationship, with all its attendant duties
and liabilities, the Court turned to an examination of the Act.' 9
Analyzing the language and legislative history of the Act, the
9. 28 U.S.C. S 1505 (1976).
10. 591 F.2d at 1304.

11. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 536 (1980).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
Id.
424 U.S. 392 (1976).
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).

18. Id.
19. Id. at 540-44.
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Court held that the General Allotment Act created only "a
limited trust. 2 0° The Act could not be read to impose a
fiduciary duty on the Government in its management of Indian
timber resources. 2 '
The dissent in Mitchell also used Testan as a basis for its
analysis. 22 The holding in Testan, according to the dissent, was
that a "statute creates a substantive right enforceable against
the United States in money damages only if it 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.' ",23 The dissent reasoned that
the General Allotment Act could be so interpreted. This interpretation could be derived from the language of the Act as well
as from its legislative history.
The language of the General Allotment Act, contended the
dissent, explicitly established a trust.2 4 The trust created by

the Act contained all the necessary elements of a common law
trust: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian
allottees), and the corpus (the designated allotment lands). 2 5r

The dissent also noted that the General Allotment Act was
enacted against the backdrop of a long established trust relationship between the United States and the Indians. It would
not be reasonable, the dissent argued, to assume that Congress
intended "to depart from these well-known fiduciary prin-6
2
ciples" when it enacted the General Allotment Act.
Therefore, the General Allotment Act created a trust which
"imposes fiduciary obligations on the United States as trustee
in the management of allotted timber lands, and provides a
damage remedy against the United States for breach of those
obligations."

27

20. Id. at 542-44. The Court noted that even though a trust had been created the language

had not unambiguously provided that the United States assume full fiduciary duties over
allotted lands. The Court reasoned that the trust created by the GAA was limited in that
the Government simply wished to prevent alienation of the land and to protect the allottees from state taxation. Id.
21. Id. at 546.
22. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 54647 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372
F.2d 1003, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
24. Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting).

25. Id.at 548 (White, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
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If read narrowly, the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell
could be interpreted as foreclosing breach of trust suits in the
Court of Claims for two reasons. First, the narrow Testan interpretation of 28 U.S.C. S 1491 controls, and therefore, the
Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute that contains no
grant of sovereign immunity.28 Second, since the majority in
Mitchell completely ignored the trust relationship which had
traditionally existed between the United States and the Indians, the Indians could no longer rely upon those trust prina basis for breach of trust suits against the Governciples as
29
ment.
JURISDICTION OF BREACH OF TRUST CLAIMS

The majority in Mitchell relied upon the Court's earlier
decision in United States v. Testan as the definitive case interpreting the Tucker Act.30 The Plaintiffs in Testan were two
government attorneys who were suing for reclassification of
their jobs and seeking corresponding back pay. The attorneys
brought the case under the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims remanded the case to the Civil Service
Commission with directions to reclassify the claimants.3 1 The
Supreme Court granted certioraris 2 because of the importance
of establishing the "measure of the Court of Claims statutory
jurisdiction .... ,,a The respondents in Testan contended that
the Tucker Act waived sovereign immunity "with respect to
any claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal
statute."3 4 Consequently, where there has been a violation of a
substantive right, as found in either the Constitution or a
"as to all
statute, the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity
' 35
measures necessary to redress that violation."
The Court held that the Tucker Act was only a jurisdictional statute and did not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.3 6 Fur28. Id. at 538.
29. Id. at 535-46.
30. Id. at 538.
31. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 395 (1976).
32. United States v. Testan, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
33. 424 U.S. at 397.
34. Id. at 400.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 398.
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thermore, in a suit against the United States there "cannot be
a right to money damages without a waiver of sovereign immunity .... ,,s The Court concluded that entitlement to money
damages depended upon whether the federal statute involved
could "fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damage sustained." 8 8 Consequently, if Testan controls and the Tucker Act does not waive
sovereign immunity, the statute relied upon by the Indians in
breach of trust suits must not only grant a substantive right
but must be able to be interpreted as mandating compensation
for the violation of that right.
The suggestion by the respondents in Testan that the
Government had confused two very different issues, namely,
whether there had been a waiver of sovereign immunity and
whether a substantive right had been created, surfaces again
in Mitchell.39 The Court in Mitchell merely stated conclusions
concerning these issues and did not clearly support those conclusions. The respondents in Testan and Mitchell based their
claims on substantive rights found in federal statutes. Since
these rights were statutory, the Tucker Act provided jurisdiction over violations of those rights in the Court of Claims. The
grant of jurisdiction over those claims implied a waiver of
sovereign immunity. The Court in Mitchell summarily dismissed that analysis by stating that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit and that the Tucker Act granted no
substantive rights. Admittedly, no substantive rights are
granted by the Tucker Act, but the issue of whether or not the
Tucker Act contains a waiver of sovereign immunity should
not be so easily dismissed. It is arguable that the Tucker Act
and 28 U.S.C. S 1505 established jurisdiction over actions based on the Constitution or a federal statute and concomitantly
waived sovereign immunity. A brief look at the history of the
Court of Claims supports this argument.
The Court of Claims was created to entertain suits against
the United States and thereby relieve Congress of the onerous
duty of hearing private claims. 40 The Tucker Act was intro37. Id. at 400.
38. Id. (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d at 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
39. Brief of Amici Curiae at 9, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). See Hughes,
supra note 3, at 458.
40. Naylor, The United States Court of Claims, 29 GEO. L.J. 719 (1940-1941).
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duced in 1886 to expand the jurisdiction of the court. 41 An exchange between Representative Tucker, the sponsor of the
Act, and Representative Reed emphasizes that the United
States' consent to be sued was implicit in the Act. 42 This consent was recognized one hundred years later in a speech by
Newall Ellison commemorating the court's anniversary when
Ellison noted that the very idea of sovereign immunity is an
anathema to an independent people. 43 That the consent to be
sued is implied in the jurisdictional grant is also noted in
Wright & Miller's civil procedure treatise: "Probably the...
best known [example]... of [a] legislative [exception] to the
sovereign immunity doctrine [is] the Tucker Act ....
The Court in Mitchell extended its Testan interpretation of
the Tucker Act to 28 U.S.C. S 1505 which was the statute
relied upon by the Quinaults in asserting their tribal claim."
Again, an examination of the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 5
1505 compels a different interpretation. Before 1946, Indian
claims were heard by the Court of Claims only under special
jurisdictional statutes. 46 In 1946 Congress passed the Indian
Claims Commission Act. 47 The purpose of the bill was twofold:
bar1) to give tribes their day in court on old claims previously
48
claims.
future
to
as
bar
the
remove
to
2)
and
red,
The authorization for the Court of Claims to hear new
claims is now codified at 28 U.S.C. S 1505.49 The legislative
history of this section supports the contention that it, too, contains an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. The principle
sponsor of the bill in the House, Representative Henry
Jackson, stated "[L]et us see that the Indians have their fair
41. H.R. 6974, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). Prior to 1886, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over any claim based on an act of Congress, an executive regulation or on an express
or implied contract with the Government. The Tucker Act extended that jurisdiction to

include damages for any claim, other than tort claims, to which a party would be entitled

to redress against the United States.
42. "Mr. Reed: '[T]he effect of the bill is that the U.S. can be made a party in any suit where
an individual could be made a party?' Mr. Tucker: 'Yes, Sir'." 18 CONG. REC. 622 (1887).
43. Ellison, The United States Court of Claims:Keeper of the Nation's Conscience for One
Hundred Years, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 251, 252 (1956).
44. WRIGHT, MILLER AND COOPER, 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 3656 (1976).
45. 445 U.S. at 540.
46. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Before The Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 511
(1966-1967).
47. 25 U.S.C. S 70 (1976). This chapter relates only to claims accruing before August 13,
1946. Jurisdiction of Indian claims after that date comes under 28 U.S.C. S 1505 (1976),
as noted in the text.
48. Brief for Respondents at 23, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
49. Id.
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day in court so that they can call the various GovernmentAgencies to account on the obligations the Federal Government
assumed. "50
The House Report, in its summary of the Indian Claims
Commission Act, also indicated that the Act contained a
waiver of sovereign immunity. The report noted that the Court
of Claims may hear "any controversy with the Federal
Government that may arise in the future."5 1 It seems clear,
then, that 28 U.S.C. S 1505 can also be interpreted as containing a waiver of sovereign immunity for Indian claims.
The Supreme Court, however, chose to apply the stringent
Testan view, which repudiates the argument that an implicit
waiver of sovereign immunity can be found in both the Tucker
Act and 28 U.S.C. S 1505. It has been suggested that Testan
was decided incorrectly and should be repudiated in breach of
trust claims. 52 If that were done, the Court of Claims could
assert its jurisdiction over Indian breach of trust claims
without having to resort to a case-by-case policy analysis in
order to find a substantive claim and thereby a waiver of
sovereign immunity.
THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP

The second notable aspect of the Mitchell decision was the
Court's interpretation of the trust relationship between the
United States and the Indians, and its reluctance to find any
substantive rights in that trust relationship. A brief historical
summary is helpful in understanding the development of the
trust relationship.53
50. 92 CONG. REC. 5312 (1946) (emphasis added).
51. H.R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946).
52. Orme, Tucker Act JurisdictionOver Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 855,
882.

53. Property is one of the major elements in any trust relationship. In order to understand
more fully the trust relationship that developed between the United States and the Indians, it will be helpful to include here a brief summary of the development of property
titles. Property titles in the United States were of dual origin. The settlors claimed title to
land by discovery and the Indians claimed title by aboriginal right of occupancy. Justice
Marshall assigned priorities to the titles by stating that "[d]iscovery gave an exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest. ."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). During the westward expansion, the
United States began trading large, unoccupied tracts of land in the west for tracts occupied by Indians in the east. It was hoped that this would give the Indians more time to
assimilate themselves into white society. This became the genesis of the reservation
system. MAXFIELD, DIETERICH AND TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON
AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 17, 18, 24, 25 (1977).
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The trust relationship between the United States and the
Indians had its inception in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.5 4 The
Cherokees sought injunctive relief as a sovereign nation
against the State of Georgia for executing laws that infringed
upon the Cherokee's political society. The tribe also sought to
prevent Georgia from taking Indian property. Chief Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, stated in dicta:
[T]he relation of the Indians to the United States is
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist
nowhere else. .

.

. They acknowledge themselves, in

their treaties to be under the protection of the United
States. .
. [T]heir relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to
our government for protection; rely upon its kindness
and power; appeal to it for relief of their wants .... 5
In another landmark case, Worcester v. Georgia,5 6 Justice Marshall referred to the weaker Cherokee nation as accepting the
57
protection of the stronger United States.
When no challenge was issued to test this
"guardian-ward" relationship during the removal of the Indians to the West, the courts "recast the Marshall guardianship principle" into a source of federal power.5 8 This power
and its attendant liability were clearly expressed in Seminole
Nation v. United States.59 There, the Court held the government liable for mishandling Indian trust funds, stating
Under a humane and self imposed policy which has
found expression in many acts of Congress and
numerous decisions of this Court it [the Government]
has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the
54. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
55. Id. at 17. The Cherokees sought an injunction against the State of Georgia to restrain the
state from taxing Cherokee property. The Court held that it had no original jurisdiction in
this dispute. Id. at 20.
56. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). A missionary challenged his arrest within the limits of the
Cherokee nation. The Court held that since the Cherokees were a sovereign nation,
Georgia law did not extend to Cherokee territory and therefore the arrest was invalid. Id.
at 563.
57. Id. at 561.
58. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (1975). See also Comment, Indian Battle for SelfDetermination,58 CAL. L. REV. 445, 449 (1970).
59. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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acts of those who represent it in the dealing with the Indians, should therefore
be judged by the most exacting
60
fiduciary standards.

The standard imposed by the Seminole case became a
guideline for the breach of trust cases that followed. The principle that emerges from these cases is that "[C]ongress intends
specific adherence to the trust responsibility by executive officials unless it has expressly provided otherwise." 61 A breach
of this "specific adherence to the trust-responsibility" would
therefore impose liability. The imposition of liability would imply a waiver of sovereign immunity.
This is the backdrop against which the Supreme Court
decision in Mitchell and the subsequent breach of trust cases in
the Court of Claims should be viewed. Given this background,
it is not difficult to see why the Mitchell Court's refusal to
recognize the trust responsibility, with its full panoply of
duties and liabilities, created alarm.6 2 In spite of the gloomy
predictions of some commentators, however,6 3 a survey of the
Indian breach of trust cases since Mitchell leaves some optimism for those concerned with Indian affairs. A careful
analysis of each case provides an insight into the methods
employed by the Court of Claims in overcoming the strictures
imposed by Mitchell.
BREACH OF TRUST CASES IN THE
COURT OF CLAIMS AFTER Mitchell

The first breach of trust case to reach the Court of Claims
after the Supreme Court decision in Mitchell was Navajo Tribe
of Indians v. United States.64 This case, like Mitchell, had a
long litigation history and arose originally under the Indian
Claims Commission Act. 66 The Navajo Indians demanded an
accounting from the Government for mismanagement of
Navajo funds and property. 66 The Government, in its opposition to the accounting claims, contended that no fiduciary
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 296-97.
Chambers, supra note 58, at 1248 (emphasis added).
See Hughes, supra note 3, at 448.
Id. See Also Barsh, U.S. v. Mitchell DecisionNarrows Trust Responsibility, 6 AM. IND. J.
2 (Aug. 1980).
64. 624 F.2d 981 (Ct. C1. 1980).
65. Id. at 983.
66. Id. at 988.
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obligation could exist without an express provision in a treaty
or statute creating a trust relationship between the United
States and the Indians. 67 The court viewed the existence of a
trust relationship as the "seminal question" in this case as well
as in other Claims Commission Act accountings. 8 In determining the existence of a trust relationship, the court rejected the
Government's contention that the trust relationship must be
explicitly created in a statute. 9 Instead, the court found that
the existence of the relationship could be "inferred from the
nature of the transaction or activity." 70
The key to the court's reasoning seems to be the control
7
the Government assumes over tribal monies or properties. ' If
the Government "takes on or has control or supervision over
tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally
exists.., even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute about a trust fund, or a trust or
fiduciary connection." 72 In direct opposition to the Government position, the court implies that when Government control
is exercised over Indian property, the trust relationship exists
unless Congress has expressly provided otherwise."3 The court
found that the trust relationship that existed in Navajo created
a duty on the part of the Government. 74 Therefore, a breach of
that duty would consititute a breach of trust for which the
76
Government would be held accountable.
The Navajo court declined, however, to apply all the rules
that governed private fiduciaries to an accounting claim by an
Indian tribe against the United States.76 The court stated that
the precise scope of the obligation, and therefore the precise
scope of the liability, must be determined on a case-by-case
67. Id. at 987.
68. Id. at 987 n.l. "Though this issue [the fiduciary relationship between the United States
and the Indians] does not arise in the context of a dispostive ruling (in Part I of the trial
judge's opinion) we consider it now because we view it as a seminal question for all of the
further proceedings in this accounting and in other Claims Commission Act accountings."

Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 987.
The court cites an impressive amount of authority to support its reasoning here.
at 989.
at 988.
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basis.7" In this case, the court found that the Government was
obligated to account for the management of the tribe's timber
and the proceeds for fire-damaged timber.78 The tribe could
also recover any funds, minus offsets, that were improperly
79
expended and were not used for the benefit of the Indians.
However, the Navajos could not recover on the claim that
tribal funds should have been deposited, when earned, in interest bearing accounts.80 The Indian claim that the Government had a separate obligation to invest tribal funds productively was remanded to the trial court for further consideration. 8
The next breach of trust case to come before the Court of
Claims was American Indians Residing in the Maricopa-Ak
Chin Reservation v. United States.8 2 The reservation, which
was created by executive order, was semi-arid. 3 In 1946, the
Superintendent of the Pima Indian Agency executed two longterm leases for the development of irrigated agriculture on the
reservation.*84 Subsequently, additional ten-year leases were
granted pursuant to a reservation development policy adopted
by the Indians.8 5
The Indians claimed that all of the leases were a "product
of a continuing wrongful course of conduct '8 6 in that the longterm leases ignored local agricultural practices.8 7 The Indians
further asserted that the Government breached its fiduciary
duty by failing to obtain fair rental values for the properties. 8
Finally, the Indians sought damages for the Government's
failure as a trustee to administer reservation property in ac89
cordance with a proper fiduciary standard.
77. Id. The court declined to apply the rule that if a beneficiary claims breach of trust, he is
entitled to recover on the claim unless the fiduciary affirmatively establishes that it properly discharged its trust. The second trust principle the court declined to apply was that
failure to render the precise form of accounting required was sufficient, in and of itself, to
establish liability. Id.
78. Id. at 989.
79. Id. at 991.
80. Id. at 995.
81. Id.
82. 667 F.2d 980 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
83. Id. at 985.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 986.
86. Id. at 989.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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The court examined the trust relationship and again found
its genesis in the control the Government asserted over Indian
affairs. 90 Denying that the trust must be expressly created by
treaty, agreement or statute, the court stated that "[T]he trust
or fiduciary relationship [the Indians] ha[ve] with the Government arises not from the specific terms of a document; it exists
because [the Government] has assumed control and supervision over [Indian] money and property." 91 The court concluded, therefore, that the Government was a trustee with
92
reference to its dealings with Indian reservation property.
Since the Government was a trustee, it would be held to
the "highest fiduciary standards," 93 even though the court
again declined to apply all the rules that govern private
fiduciary relationships. 4 Damages were allowed because the
losses incurred were the result of a breach of trust in the
Government's management of tangible trust property. 95
Damages were determined by adjustments between the actual
amount received by the Indians and the fair market value of
the lease. 96 The records in this case were inadequately kept by
the Government, so the court granted all the claims clearly
must
established by the Indians, noting that the Government
97
record-keeping.
poor
suffer the consequences of its
The third breach of trust case, Duncan v. United States,98
was heard in the Court of Claims on remand. The facts in that
case involved the Pomo Indians in California. The Pomos lived
on the Robinson Rancheria, which was terminated99 according
to the terms of the Rancheria Act. 100 In order to facilitate and
90. Id. at 990.
91. Id. The court also cited Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923), and Coast Indian
Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977), stating: "Plaintiff's rights and
defendant's obligations arise from the creation of the reservation, and defendant, as
regards its dealings with Indian reservation property, is a trustee." 667 F.2d at 990.
92. 667 F.2d at 990.
93. Id.
94. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the Government's failure to render an accounting in
the form required by a fiduciary was not in and of itself sufficient to establish liability. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 996-97.

97. Id. at 1005.
98. 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
99. Termination was a federal Indian policy pursued by the United States from 1945 to 1961.
The object of the policy was to reduce Government involvement in Indian affairs. See
Wilkinson and Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. IND. L. REV.139
(1977).

100. Duncan v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The Rancheria Act, Pub. L.
No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958). "This law provided for termination of the special status
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encourage termination, the Act provided that the Government
would build sanitation and irrigation systems on the Rancheria
before the land would be conveyed to private owners under the
distribution plan. 101 The Government failed to complete the
sanitation and irrigation projects. Nevertheless, the Rancheria
was terminated. 10 2 The Indians brought suit for breach of trust
and the Court of Claims held that damages were recoverable
for the breach.10 3 The judgment was vacated and remanded by
0 4
the Supreme Court in light of Mitchell.1
On remand, 105 The Court of Claims found that Mitchell
was not applicable because the Supreme Court in Mitchell
limited its investigation of the trust obligation to the terms of
the General Allotment Act. 10 6 The Court of Claims noted that
the Supreme Court had left open the issue of "whether a
statute imposing on the Government general fiduciary duties
toward the Indians would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity." 7 The Court of Claims believed that such a statute
could waive sovereign immunity and that the Rancheria Act fit
that criterion. 0 8 The Court of Claims found that a trust relationship existed for two reasons: the language in the Rancheria
Act, 10 9 and the Government's subsequent recognition of the
trust relationship by its assumption of control over the Rancheria. 10 The court reasoned that the governing statute need
not spell out specifically all the duties of the Government as

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

(as Indian lands) of various California Rancherias upon approval by a majority of the affected Indians of a final distribution plan." 597 F.2d at 1340. In 1964 the Act was amended to expand the scope of the Secretary's responsibility to include sanitation facilities.
Pub. L. No. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390 (1964). The Reservation was terminated in 1965. See
Table Bluff Band of Indians v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 255 (D.C.N. Cal. 1981). That case involved a similar fact situation and was brought by the Indians under the Rancheria Act in
the District Court of Northern California. The Court held inter-aliathat (1) where the
trust relationship between the United States and Indians residing on trust land was
wrongflly terminated the lands could be returned to the United States to be held in trust
(532 F. Supp. at 260), but (2) Indians were not entitled to recover money damages against
the United States for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of statutory duties, or breach of
contract created by the distribution plan or for a fifth amendment taking of vested rights.
532 F. Supp. at 264.
Duncan v. United States, 597 F.2d at 1340 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 1339.
United States v. Duncan, 446 U.S. 903 (1980).
Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id. Even though the court used the language of the Rancheria Act to establish the trust
relationship, it is important that the court noted that the language of the Act did not expressly state that the United States held the land as trustee. Id.
Id. at 41-42.
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trustee. The long established history of governmental
fiduciary obligation in the management of Indian property was
enough to support a broad scale Congressional establishment
of a trust. 111
The control analysis used in Navajo was again applied to
establish the fiduciary relationship. 11 2 The court concluded
that the Rancheria Act "mandated compensation for federal
breaches of trust.. ." and that under 28 U.S.C. S 1491, the
Court of Claims was the proper forum in which to seek
damages. 113 In its consideration of damages, the court reviewed the claims for damages in previous Indian cases.1 14 The
court concluded that the test should always be that of "proximate causation by a proven breach of trust."1 5 Consequently,
only actual damages were allowed.1 1 6
The reconsideration of Mitchell by the Court of Claims in
this review of breach of trust claims is most illuminating." 7 On
remand, the Indians did not base their claim on the General
Allotment Act. The Indians' claims were based instead on
timber management statutes." 8 The Government again moved
to have the case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, claiming
that Congress had not waived sovereign immunity either
through the Tucker Act or 28 U.S.C. S 1505 or through any
other statute invoked by the Indians." 9
The court answered this argument with a two-pronged
analysis. First, the court reasoned that if a statute could fairly
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Govern111. Id. at 42. The court specifically distinguished the trust created by the General Allotment
Act, which was limited, from the trust created by the Rancheria Act, which was general.
The court rationalized this by saying that nothing in the legislative history of the Rancheria Act or in the course of its administration suggested that the trust was to have a
restricted purpose. Id.
112. Id. The court noted that the ruling in Navajo "squarely applies to [Duncan] as well." Id.
113. Id. at 44.
114. Id. at 46-47. The court gave an excellent review of the cases involving compensation for
breach of trust claims.
115. Id. at 49.
116. Id.
117. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
118. Id. at 269. The Indian's claims were based on the following statutes: 25 U.S.C. SS 406-407
(1976) (timber sales); 25 U.S.C. S 466 (1976) (regulations and sustained-yield); 25 U.S.C.
SS 318a, 323-325 (1976) (rights-of-way). For a review of the Government s pervasive control and harvesting of Indian timber, see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980).
119. 664 F.2d at 267.
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ment, then it would have been superfluous 20° "for Congress to
add expressly in that statute that suit may be maintained in
[the Court of Claims]. '12 ' The court noted that Congressional
consent to Court of Claims jurisdiction over pecuniary claims
was given in the Tucker Act and 28 U.S.C. S 1505.122
Second, the court did not believe that the only statutes
mandating compensation were those that expressly authorized
it.123 The court noted that "neither Testan nor Mitchell exclude[d] all non-express indications of the right to compensation," but merely demanded a close and careful reading of the
relevant statute to determine whether the statute could "fairly
be read as mandating compensation." 124 The relevant statutes
must be read" 'with that conservatism which is appropriate in
the case of a waiver of sovereign immunity.' 125 The court
acknowledged that a statute may contain an implicit waiver of
sovereign immunity. The court concluded that "The only inescapable principle is that Congress's waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to money compensation must be clear or
strong before the court can say that the statute mandates compensation.' ' 26 The court further noted that the strict requirement for an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, if
it applied at all, wouldn't be "extended to a substantive claim
within the Tucker Act...., 2 7
The court then applied the above analysis to the relevant
timber management statutes in Mitchell.1 28 The court noted
that the Supreme Court in White MountainApache v. Bracker
had interpreted the same statutes as giving the Government
comprehensive control and management of timber resources
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 268.

(emphasis added).
(citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941)).
at 268-69.
at 269 n.4 (emphasis in original). The court stated:

In refusing to accord us jurisdiction beyond that historically recogrnized in
this court, the Supreme Court may be said sometimes to have rested almost exclusively on the absence of an express Congressional statute waiving sovereign
immunity. But this extremely strict requirement of an express statute, if it be a
true sine qua non at all, has not, we think, been extended to a substantive claim
within the Tucker Act-e.g. a monetary claim founded on an Act of Congress.
128. Id. at 269. Those statutes included: 25 U.S.C. S 406-407 (1976) (timber sales); 25 U.S.C.
S 406 (1976) (regulations and sustained-yield); 25 U.S.C. SS 318a, 323-325 (1976) (rights-

of-way).
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on Indian lands. 12 9 This comprehensive control then created a
fiduciary relationship between the Government and the Indians. 130 Even though the word trust was never used in the
relevant statutes,' 3 ' the court reasoned that they were "infused" with the long-continuing doctrine of governmental
fiduciary obligation. These later statutes thus broadened the
limited trust imposed by the General Allotment Act into one
which imposed a special fiduciary obligation on the government for managing Indian lands. 1'3 2 The court noted that
nothing in the relevant legislation "suggests that Congress
wished, contrary to historical principle, to depart from the
33
norm of fiduciary duty."'
Given this finding of a fiduciary responsibility in the relevant acts, the court concluded, a breach of that responsibility
mandated compensation.' 3 4 Damages were limited, however,
to direct damages. No consequential or indirect damages were
allowed. As it had done in Navajo, Duncan, and Maricopa-Ak
Chin, the court again stated the principle that the full panoply
of damages applicable in a private trust suit was not applicable
in an Indian breach of trust suit.' 35

The only breach of trust action after Mitchell in which the
Court of Claims denied damages was Hydaburg v. United
as
States. 3 6 The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) 37 was used 138
Hydaburg.
in
relationship
trust
a
the basis for establishing
The Hydaburg Cooperative Association (the Association) was a
chartered Indian corporation within S 17 of the Indian
Reorganization Act. 139 Accordingly, the Association was eligible for loans to finance business ventures. These loans were
129. 664 F.2d at 269 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145-48
(1980)).

130. Id. at 270.
131. Id.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 271.
135. Id. See also The American Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v.
United States, 667 F.2d 980 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. C1.
1981); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981 (Ct. C1. 1980).
136. 667 F.2d 64 (Ct. C1. 1981).
137. 25 U.S.C. SS 461-479 (1976). The goal of the Act was to encourage Indian selfgovernment. See Comment, Tribal Self-Governnent and the Indian ReorganizationAct
of 1984, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
138. 667 F.2d at 67.
139. Id. at 65.
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administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)." 0 The
Association purchased salmon fleets and canneries, which proved initially to be a successful business venture. 141 For various
reasons, however, the venture floundered and the BIA, in an
effort to minimize losses, terminated the employment contract
of the cannery manager. 142 The Association had negotiated the
contract.1 43 The Association claimed that this interference by
the Government was breach of trust under the IRA,144 since
the Government had a fiduciary duty to "promote, manage and
maintain all assets and enterprises acquired by Indians pursuant to the Act."' 145
The court noted that the relevant inquiry was to determine
the scope of the fiduciary relationship that Congress had intended when the Indian Reorganization Act was passed. After
making this inquiry, the court applied both the trust and the
jurisdictional limitations imposed by Mitchell. 46 Examining
the Indian Reorganization Act, the Hydaburg court concluded
that the trust relationship in it, like the General Allotment Act
in Mitchell, was limited to preventing alienation of Indian
lands. 147 The Indians argued that the loan fund statutes 48
should be analogized to the timber statutes, 149 and therefore
should support jurisduction in the Court of Claims. The court
disagreed, noting that the IRA loan provisions imposed no
management standards on the Government, and concluded
that Congress never intended to be liable "as afiduciary for
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67. The Indian Reorganization Act, provided that the title to lands taken pursuant
to the Act "shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or
individual Indian for which the land is acquired.. . ." 25 U.S.C. $ 465 (1976).
667 F.2d at 67.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
25 U.S.C. S 470 (1976) (loan fund). This section provides in pertinent part:
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any funds in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $10,000,000 to be established as a
revolving fund from which the Secretary of the Interior, under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe, may make loans to Indian chartered corporations for the purpose of promoting the economic development of such tribes and
of their members....
667 F .2d at 68.26 U.S.C. S 466 (1976) (timber management). This section provides in pertinent
part:
The
Secretary of the Interior is directed to make rules ind regulations for the
operation and management of Indian forestry units on the principle of
sustained-yield management, to restrict the number of livestock grazed on Indian range units. ... and to promulgate such other rules and regulations as may
be necessary.
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the promotion, maintenance and management of assets and
enterprises acquired by the Indians pursuant to the Act." 150
Accordingly, all the breach of trust claims in Hydaburg were
dismissed. 16!
The court did not explicitly address the control element,
but the facts indicate that the enterprise was generally run by
the Indians themselves. The Bureau of Indian Affairs made
management decisions only when the cannery was facing
bankruptcy.15 2 Therefore, the Hydaburg court's decision was
consistent with its other decisions 153 in not finding the existence of a trust relationship. The Government's pervasive
control over Indian operations could not be established.
DEFINING THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP

AFTER United States v. Mitchell

An examination of the breach of trust suits brought in the
Court of Claims subsequent to Mitchell reveals that the impact
of Mitchell has been minimal in the resolution of these suits.
The Court of Claims has declined to read Mitchell rigidly and
considers the "limited trust"'15 4 definition applicable to the
General Allotment Act only. 155 The court has based the trust
relationship on a variety of statutes, but a pattern begins to
emerge in the court's analysis of them. This pattern might be
termed a "control analysis." In each case, the court examined
the relevant statute to determine the amount of control that
the government assumes over the management of Indian property and affairs. The degree of control seems to vary from
case to case, ranging from limited in Hydaburg to comprehensive in Mitchell. When the government assumes comprehensive control over Indian money and property, a fiduciary relationship is created. 5 6 This fiduciary relationship, in turn, imposes liabilities on the Government for its breach.
150. 667 F.2d at 69 (emphasis in original).
151. Id.
152. Id, at 65.
153. See The American Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v. United
States, 667 F.2d 980 (Ct. C1. 1981); Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 624 F.2d 981 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
154. See supra note 20.
155. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 40 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
156. See supra note 153.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 2

510

LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

In using this "control analysis" the court has adhered to a
fundamental legal concept as defined by the legal philosopher,
Wesley Hohfeld. 15 According to Hohfeld, there can be no
right without a duty; no power without the correlative
liability. 158 This application to breach of trust suits is not only
legally logical, but can be considered politically logical as well.
If the Government is not held responsible for its actions, a
political vacuum is created. When a vacuum is created, the
more powerful entity moves to fill it. In other words, if the
Government is not held responsible for its actions, it may, in
effect, operate without rules. If the Government operates
without rules it may do so to the detriment of the weaker entity, namely, the Indians. In fact, this sequence is one which has
occurred in our history many times. 15 9 This should serve as a
warning to those who see the trust relationship as an impediment to Indian sovereignty. 160 Sovereignty must be founded

upon a strong economic base, and the Indians themselves 1 6 as
well as many commentators 162 and legislators, 63 recognize
that fact. In many cases the Indians are unable or unwilling to
manage their own resources.16 4 If the Government, as
manager of those resources, is not held accountable, then the
Indians' economic base is in danger of disappearing altogether.
The continuation of the trusteeship with its attendant duties
and liabilities is therefore essential to the preservation of Indian sovereignty. The Court of Claims implicitly recognizes
this in its "control analysis."
In using the "control analysis" to establish a trust relationship, the court declines to place a strong emphasis on the
157. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (rev. ed. 1978).

158. Id. at 38.
159. This premise is clearly illustrated by a review of the United States' policies toward the Indian. For an overview of the United States' policies concerning Indian affairs, see
COHEN, supra note 5, at 47-180.

160. Barsh, supra note 63, at 14.
161. Two organizations founded by the Indians to help promote tribal economic development
are the Council of Energy Resources Tribes (CERT) and the United Indian Development
Association (UIDA). Both of these organizations operate on federal funds. For a discussion of these organizations and other efforts to promote tribal independence, see
Winslow, The Last Stand? 6 AM. IND. J. 2, 8 (Sept. 1980).
162. See, e.g., Ickes, Tribal Economic Independence-The Means to Achieve True TribalSelfDetermination,26 S.D.L. REV. 494 (1981); Ruffing, Agendafor Action, 6 AM. IND. J. 14
(July 1980); Comment, Indian Tribes:Self DeterminationThrough Effective Management
of NaturalResources, 17 TULSA L.J. 507 (1982).
163. Senator John Melchor (D-Mont.) introduced Senate Bill No. 1894. This bill would give
tribes and individual Indian owners an opportunity to negotiate their own oil and gas
leases. See Comment, supra note 162, at 510.
164. Cleaves, A Betrayal of Trust: The Main Settlement Act and the Houltan Band of
Maliseets, 6 AM. IND. J. 2 (Nov. 1980). Winslow, supra note 161, at 6.
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precise language of the statute. The court's contention that a
trust may exist even though the word "trust" is never used in
the statute upon which claims are based is consistent with the
law of trusts:
The trust is the whole judicial device, the legal relationship between the parties with respect to the property
which is its subject matter, and includes not merely the
duties which the trustee owes to the beneficiary... but
also the rights, privileges [and] powers which the
beneficiary has against the trustee .... 16 r
The application of these principles to the trust relationship
which exists between the Government and the Indians satisfies
the symmetry required by the law.
REMEDIES FOR INDIAN BREACH OF TRUST CLAIMS

The remedy in Indian breach of trust suits has always been
limited to actual damages. 166 This seems inadequate in view of
the fact that most of these cases have a long litigation
history.' 6 7 The tribe's natural resources may be completely
depleted by the time the complex litigation is completed. The
Indian community must maintain a strong economic base if it
is to preserve its sovereignty. 168 If that base is depleted, Indians may be forced to abandon their communities and thus,
Native American culture may face complete extinction. In
view of this, perhaps the Indians' claims in Duncan for
damages for injury to Indian culture and subsequent emotional
169
and psychological injuries were not unreasonable.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

ScoTT, I THE LAW OF TRUSTS S 2.4 (1967) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 135.
It should be noted that the litigation in Mitchell took eight years.
See supra text accompanying notes 161-163.
667 F.2d at 46. Two other remedies might also be considered. One writer suggests that
"if there is a sovereign immunity problem with the Tucker Act, the issue could be avoided
if suit is brought seeking equitable relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 26
U.S.C. SS 450 (a)-(n) (1976)." Comment, Whom Can the Indian Trust After Mitchell? 53
U. COLO. L. REV. 179 (1981). This would not allow damages but would at least insure that
mismanagement would cease. Another option may be to bring an action under 28 U.S.C. S
1983 (1976). In a recent case, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court
held that section 1983 applied to rights secured by the Constitution and by all federal
laws, thereby rejecting assertions that it is limited to color-of-state law and civil rights
statutory violations. This case could be viewed as carte blanche for claims against the
United States. See Note Section 1983: CarteBlanche Remedy for FederalStatutory Violations? 10 STETSON L. REV. 506 (1981). This decision also allowed attorney's fees under 28
U.S.C. S 1988 (1976), which could be a major expense in complex Indian litigation. 448
U.S. at 9.
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The Court of Claims contends that other kinds of damages
would require Congressional authority because no precedent
exists for recovery of consequential damages of this nature. 7 0
It can be assumed that the court created a fiduciary relationship using the "control analysis" in order to reach equitable
results. Even more equitable results would have been achieved
of the court were also willing to enlarge the remedy available
for the breach of that trust. The court should consider applying
the full panoply of remedies available in private breach of trust
suits. Perhaps the spectre of greater damages will motivate
the Government to fulfill its role as trustee to the Indians more
prudently.
PATRICIA McKEOWN NAGEL

170. Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d at 48 (Ct. CI. 1981).
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